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The discussants considered the different framings of accountability and legal responsibility 
and how these related to a range of contexts brought about by Covid-19. However, 
because of the limitations of existing frameworks of legal responsibility, it was recognized 
that it will not always be possible for them to link to the various contexts and factual 
scenarios which arise from Covid-19; necessarily, there will be gaps. 
 
Legal responsibility is a narrower subset of what is a much wider or diffuse understanding 
of accountability, the latter concept including also notions of political or moral blame. There 
is often a wish to find some kind of moral or political blame for what one or more actors did 
or did not do, or to recognise formally that what was done was insufficient or failed in some 
for frameworks of legal responsibility to respond to these calls for accountability. 
 
State responsibility as a legal concept i
international obligation; if a breach is determined, a new legal relationship emerges which 
results in an obligation to crease the wrongful act and make full reparations for injury 
caused by the internationally wrongful act. Furthermore, as a secondary rule of 
international law, state responsibility is fully dependent on whether what can be considered 
a primary rule, has been breached. Thus, the process of determining and apportioning 
state responsibility says little about the underlying breach of the primary rules which will 
be situation specific, and is not about apportionment of blame, though determinations of 
legal responsibility will inevitably still carry some moral apportionment of right and wrong, 
at least from the perspective of public perceptions.  
 
Similarly, criminal law, and international criminal law in particular is quite restricted in its 
Covid-19. This is because of the narrow set of acts or omissions which may be understood 
to fall within the definitions of crimes, but also because of the need for some personal 
culpability,  in most if not all, instances. 
 
The discussants considered some of contexts arising from Covid-19, to illustrate these 
points, but also to think through some potential openings for responsibility, for further 
exploration. For example, several of the papers in the collection explore what has been 
recognised as a truism  that Covid-19 discriminates; individuals from certain communities 
are more likely to contract the disease and have a lower likelihood of surviving it, because 
of the social determinants of health. The policies behind the responses to the pandemic 
may also exacerbate these social determinants of health and indeed some of these appear 
to sacrifice the weakest in society. There is a need to consider how this impacts on 
responsibility.  
 
Thus, if Covid- -actions (or under-
actions) have implications for legal responsibility? International law does not cater well for 
this type of scenario. There are a number of ways in which responsibility can be argued, 
though none of these are easy arguments to make or foolproof. For instance, some of the 
subordinate forms of criminal responsibility such as aiding or abetting or complicity  (before 
even arriving at superior responsibility) aid in assisting to capture some aspects of the 
factual contexts relevant to Covid-19 health responses. However, there will still remain 
challenges with respect to individual culpability and the degree to which the actions and 
omissions fit within the narrow definitions for international crimes.   
 
Also, one might consider how Covid-19 may exacerbate international crimes which are 
already taking place. For instance, in Syria, the ongoing attacks against health workers 
and hospitals may constitute a war crime. If these are done with the knowledge of the 
pandemic and the risks to local populations, the Covid-19 facts may extenuate the crimes 
even though there may not have been a specific intention to spread Covid-19; further 
spread of Covid-19 impacting on the health and lives of local populations was however the 
natural and necessary outcome of the attacks. Thus, there could be an argument to be 
made about responsibility which may derive from the act of continuing the attacks with the 
knowledge of the pandemic.  
 
In general, the point was made that international law does not deal well with widely diffused 
impacts, particularly where there are multiple actors acting in parallel, though not 
necessarily in a coordinated fashion. Perhaps one area which merits further exploration is 
the framing used by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights recognize 
interpretations suggest that one can contribute to a harm even if what one is doing is not 
in itself illegal, so long as the act is going to further the crimes of others. The Guiding 
Principles do not set out a framework for criminal responsibility; they are more concerned 
with a corporate or similar standard of responsibility. Nevertheless, the Guiding Principles 
may be helpful in thinking through how principles of responsibility that concern a multitude 
of actors can be conceived of.  
 
 
  
